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CHAPTERl 
UBUNTU: FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND INTERPRETIVE 
AID 
INTRODUCTION 
In this piece the challenge and role of courts in applying extra-textual aids in constitutional 
interpretation with specific reference to ubuntu is analysed and discussed. It is trite that South 
African courts adopt a value-orientated approach in constitutional interpretation. 1 The 1993 
Constitution specifically enjoined courts to promote values which underlie a democratic 
society based on freedom and equality. 2 Furthermore, it referred to South Africa as a 
constitutional state (rechtsstaat). 3 The concept of rechtsstaat embodies western liberal values 
which embody a balance between individual and communitarian values. 4 Equality on the other 
hand is particularly a communitarian concept. 
The 1996 Constitution on the other hand enjoins courts to promote values that underlie an 
1See Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) SA 540 (B) at 566-567, 
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994 (3) SA ECD 625 at 634A-H; S v 
Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 at para 15; S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 9-
25. 
2 See section 3 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
3 See Preamble of the 1993 Constitution. 
4 E De Wet 'Can the social state principle in Germany guide state action in South 
Africa in the field of social and economic rights?' (1995) SAJHR 30 at 39-41; K Stem 'A 
society based on the rule of law and social justice: Constitutional model of the Federal 
Republic of Germany' (1981) TSAR 241 at 247; DP Kommers 'German constitutionalism: a 
prolegomenon' (1991) Emory Law Journal 837. 
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open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 5 In its preamble it 
provides as one of its objectives the establishment of a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights. Democratic values underpin individual freedom 
as understood in western democracies whereas social justice implies the community's sense of 
justice which is characterised by the exercise of rights in the context of a group. 6 
The emphasis in the preamble to the establishment of a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental rights on the one hand and promotion of values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom on the other bring 
about tension between these values that need to be reconciled by the courts. It will be argued 
with reference to this tension that although the 1996 Constitution, unlike the 1993 
Constitution which refers to ubuntu in its postamble, does not make any reference to ubuntu 
which transcends a distinction between intra and extra-textual interpretation, its frequent 
reference to human dignity is impliedly a reference to ubuntu. Furthermore, an argument will 
be forwarded that as the fundamental underpinnings of the Constitution is the harmonisation of 
liberty and equality, courts should harmonise these two concepts within the particular African 
context of ubuntu.1 
5 See section 3 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 See CRM Dlamini 'Human Rights in South Africa Which Way South Africa?' 
Butterworths (1995) 89-90, D Davis 'The underlying theory that informs the wording of our 
bill ofrights' (1996) SALJ385 at 393; see also De Wet note 4. 
7 Davis note 6; J Kruger 'Is interpretation a question of common sense? Some 
reflections on value judgement and section 35' (1995) CILSA 1 at 9-11. see also M L M 
Mbao 'The province of the South African Bill of Rights determined and redetermined - A 
comment on the case of Baloro & others v University of Bophuthatswana & others' (1996) 
SALf 33 at 36-41. 
3 
Firstly ubuntu will be discussed in detail and the manner in which it fits into the wider 
constitutional picture. It will be examined with a view to link it with other constitutional 
values and how it can be used as an extra-textual aid to interpretation. Secondly ubuntu will 
be linked to African jurisprudence in general and other constitutional values which are unique 
to Africa and may be used during constitutional interpretation. In conclusion, an argument 
will be advanced that the African value system should be applied as an extra-textual aid in 
constitutional interpretation. These values and proposals on the way forward will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
4 
CHAPTER2 
UBUNTU AS EXTRA-TEXTUAL AID 
In this chapter ubuntu is examined and proposals on how it fits into the wider constitutional 
picture as well as how it can be used as an extra- textual aid to interpretation is discussed. 
Since the advent of the 1993 Constitution, ubuntu has become a focus of attention and 
ongoing discussions on the subject continue unabated. 8 These discussions have been given 
impetus by its inclusion in the postamble of the 1993 Constitution and its detailed discussion in 
the landmark case of S v Makwanyane9 in which the death penalty was declared 
unconstitutional. The postamble of the 1993 Constitution provides as follows: 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to 
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross human rights, the 
transgression of humanitarian principles in the violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt 
and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but 
not for revenge, a need fombuntu but not for victimisation. 
In order to put ubuntu in its proper perspective, I will briefly discuss its sources, what it is and 
link it to some of the constitutional values which underlie our constitution. 
2.1 Definition of ubuntu 
Ubuntu refers to an African way of life that accords respect to human dignity and equality to 
any person irrespective of status in a communitarian sense. Thus an individual has an inborn 
8 R English 'Ubuntu: The quest for and indigenous jurisprudence' (1996) SAJHR 641; 
BM Mchunu 'The need for traditional Afriean Jurisprudence in South African legal system' 
Die Landdros/ The Magistrate (1996) 55; G Carpenter 'Constitutional Court sounds death 
knell for capital punishment' (1996) THRHR 144; L Mbigi 'African Democracy' Enterprise 
(1996) 70. 
9 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
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corresponding duty to accord respect to other members of the community. Its literal 
translation is humaneness. Its roots can be traced back to rural communities. It is derived 
from community practices and inheritance from the past. 10 It is like an inborn concept where 
every member of a community does not have to be reminded that the most outstanding feature 
in life in interaction with other members of the community, is respect for human dignity. 
Children at an early age are taught to respect one another and share any delicacies that they 
may receive. They are furthermore taught to respect any person who is their parents' peer in 
the manner that they would respect their own parents. The importance of one's worth as a 
human being is always regarded as important as another person's worth. In this way human 
beings treat each other in a spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood. The culture of non-revenge 
when hurt is always deeply ingrained in the minds of children. 
2.2 Sources of ubuntu 
The main source of ubuntu are idioms which set down norms which every member of the 
community is expected to conform to. Well known amongst them is Umuntu ngumuntu nga 
bantu. Literally translated it means a person is a person because of what other members of the 
community have done for him. In short, ubuntu signifies the centrality and the importance of 
an individual's interdependence with other members of the community11 . 
10M Gelfand The Genuine Shona: Survival Values of an African Culture Mambo 
(1973) at 57-69. 
II Mbigi note 8 at 70. 
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Another idiom which is a cornerstone of respect for human dignity is Umuntu akalahlwa 
which means that a person cannot be thrown away. 12 This idiom underscores the need for 
respect for human life and dignity whatever the circumstances. No matter what wrong an 
individual has done to the community, that individual remains a human being worthy of 
humane and equal treatment. A person's right to human dignity is not in any way lessened by 
that person's transgressions. One glaring example is the punishment which was usually meted 
out to a person accused of practising witchcraft which results in death, ubuntu required that 
such a person be ordered to leave the boundaries of the community concerned. To show that 
members of community still regarded that person as a human being worthy of dignity, they 
would even assist that person's carry belongings away. 
Traditional communities exist under the leadership of traditional leaders. In other words, 
political power is wielded by the traditional leader and his councillors. The idiom which 
underscores political power is inkosi yi nkosi nga bantu bayo. This means that a traditional 
leader is what he or she is because of the people and owes allegiance to them. Thus ubuntu 
would require that decisions of a traditional leader are all transparent and a reflection of the 
legal convictions of that leader's community. In traditional gatherings, everybody is allowed 
to speak, which is a reflection of freedom of speech. In traditional courts, the accused has the 
right to cross examine witnesses. Representation is understood in a different sense. 
Everybody has the right to address the court in favour of or against the accused. Therefore 
representation in a communitarian sense means everybody is free to advance arguments in 
120 Dlomo 'Strategic advantages that can be derived from ubuntu' (Paper delivered at 
a Seminar on 'incorporation of ubuntu into a uniquely South African approach to 
management' held in Midrand) on 3 0 October 1991. 
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favour of or against the accused. 
Where an accused has been found guilty, that accused may be fined a goat which may be 
slaughtered in the traditional leader's kraal. To show that the accused is not ostracised by the 
community, that accused person would be invited to share in the meat. This is an indication 
that such person will always be one of their peers and therefore deserves to be treated equally 
and with dignity. 
2.3 Ubuntu and human dignity 
Ubuntu was expressly referred to in the 1993 Constitution, but not the 1996 Constitution. It 
is submitted that ubuntu is impliedly included in the 1996 Constitution by its frequent 
reference to human dignity and forms part of the emerging South African and African 
jurisprudence. 13 Three reasons are advanced for this argument. First, the 1996 Constitution is 
drafted in a conciliatory manner reminiscent of the post amble of the 1993 Constitution in that 
it lays strong emphasis on the importance of national reconciliation and is permeated by 
respect for human dignity. 14 Secondly, strong emphasis on human dignity is an obvious 
reaction to the pre 27 April 1994 constitutional era which was characterised by human rights 
violations, and therefore respect for human dignity must form a bridge between the past and 
13 See sections 1, 7, 10, 39 and item 22 of schedule 6 which partly retains the 
postambleof the 1993 Constitution for the purpose of the Promotion of Reconciliation and 
National Unity Act 1995 (Act No. 34 of 1995); see also S v Makwanyane supra para 311, 
Article 27. 7 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights which imposes a duty on an 
individual to strengthen cultural values in a spirit of tolerance. 
14 L M du Plessis 'Evaluative reflections on the final text of South Africa's final text of 
South Africa's bill of rights' (1996) Stell LR 283 at 285, for healing of divisions of the past, 
see the Preamble of the 1996 Constitution. 
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future. 15 Thirdly, respect for human dignity fortifies and underpins certain elements of other 
rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 16 
2.4 Core values of ubuntu and justice system 
Generally speaking the axis around which the 1996 Constitution revolves is respect for human 
dignity. The concept of ubuntu requires the treatment of any person with dignity irrespective 
of that person's status. Thus a human being deserves dignity from cradle to grave. Even after 
burial of a person, members of the community of which that person is a member would for 
some days refrain from engaging in serious work as a sign of respect to that person's dignity. 
In short what can be learnt from ubuntu in this regard is that respect for human dignity is 
unconditional and everlasting. Even the most social outcasts who behave like animals would 
always be regarded as members of the community worthy of humane treatment. Criminal 
conduct does not in any way make a human being sub-human. In this regard it is interesting to 
note that the Constitution provides in section 37 that the right to human dignity is non-
derogable. This right is a core value whose application underlies the spirit of tolerance. Even 
if a person is an outcast now, that person may at a later stage be depended upon. 
Traditional courts (which are communal in character) place more emphasis on reconciliation 
than punishing the offender. In traditional communities justice is, according to Krige, realised 
15H Botha 'The values and principles underlying the 1993 Constitution' (1994) 
SAPRIPL 233 at 237; E Mureinik 'A bridge to where? Introducing the interim bill of rights' 
(1994) SAJHR 31at32. 
16 Cachalia et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution Juta (1994) 34; for a 
discussion of human dignity as a foundation of other rights see also S v Makwanyane supra 
para 328; De Wet note 4 at 34. 
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as follows: 
[l]f reconciliation ensues, the court not only rejoices but watches from afar, vicariously 
participating in, the return of the prodigal son, the wrongdoer, with the beer he has brewed and 
brought to become reconciled with his father, the aggrieved part¥. 
Common amongst the crimes in traditional communities was alleged practising of witchcraft 
which caused lightning, serious illness or death. It is interesting to note that the majority of 
blacks believe in witchcraft. 18 These people were often 'sniffed' out by witch doctors. Alleged 
practising of witchcraft has always been regarded as a serious offence by traditional 
communities. Those who were found guilty of practising so-called witchcraft were not usually 
put to death. The usual punishment was to expel them from the borders of the community 
within which they lived. Even under such circumstances those persons would be allowed to 
go to another traditional leader for permission to settle in that traditional leader's community. 
Their application must be transparent. When they leave the former community they were 
treated with dignity. Ubuntu would require that a human being despite the allegations of 
wrongdoing that human being is facing be treated with dignity. 
Thus equality and respect for human dignity are unconditional. What can be learnt from 
ubuntu in this regard is that equality with other members of the community and respect for 
human dignity is not only for the law-abiding citizens but the social outcasts as well. These 
are constitutional values which must be promoted by the courts. The feeling of 
17 JD Krige 'Some aspects of the Lovhedu judicial arrangement' (1939) Journal of 
Bantu Studies 13 3 at 144. 
18 See MS Motshekga 'The ideology behind witchcraft and the principle of fault in the 
criminal law' (1984) Codicillus 4, for the view that most blacks believe in witchcraft. 
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interdependence is always experienced when an offender has sent a socially acceptable person 
to the victim express regret to the latter. This was done as soon as possible after 
wrongdoing. The purpose of sending someone to express regret as soon as possible is to avoid 
the building up of anger on the part of the victim. The end result would be the payment of a 
small fee or even no compensation at all. This value has direct link with the procedure 
adopted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 19 One of the requirements of the 
granting of amnesty in terms of the Act which established the Commission is full disclosure. 
This also supports the argument that it is not always necessary to resort to ordinary courts to 
resolve conflicts. With regards the granting of amnesty Mahomed DP had the following to 
say: 
It is available only where there is full disclosure of all facts to the Amnesty Committe~? .. 
In accordance with ubuntu full disclosure is one basis for forgiveness and tolerance. 
Confession is an embedded theological principle among the Nguni, Sotho, Venda and 
Tsonga. 21 Therefore full disclosure or public confession is used for reconciling people who 
are in conflict as long as a person socially acceptable to both parties is present to facilitate 
such reconciliation. At times the offender would send somebody with a form of compensation 
on the basis that one day the victim may be an offender who may require pardon. 
19 See Preamble of the Truth Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
1995 (Act No. 34of1995); see also section 20(d). 
20Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Another v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and others 1996 BCLR 1015 (CC) at para 32. 
21Hammond-Tooke 'The Ancestors' Healing Process', The Weekly Mail and Guardian 
July 1-7, 1994. 
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2.5 Ubuntu in Makwanyane 
In her erudite judgement in Makwanyane Mokgoro J highlighted the key values of group 
solidarity, compassion, respect for human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective 
unity which are enveloped by the concept of ubuntu22 . She went on further to emphasise that 
the right to life and human dignity were supported by the spirit of ubuntu. The emphasis on 
human dignity in this judgement reaffirms that respect for human dignity is always inherent in 
ubuntu. The inviolability of human dignity is the basis for guaranteeing other values in the 
Constitution. 
Chaskalson P after referring to the postamble which called for the need for reparation but not 
for retaliation, emphasised that our society should not kill criminals simply to get even with 
them. He acknowledged the need to be consistent with ubuntu. Ubuntu does not call for 'an 
eye for an eye.' It acknowledges that as long as society exists criminals who are part of society 
will also be in existence. Only a humane way of dealing with them will accord with ubuntu. 23 
In his judgement Langa J also emphasised the value ubuntu puts on life and human dignity24. 
He identified the importance of another person's life as one's own. This r,easoning also 
accords with the idiom umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu. It encompasses the importance of a 
person's life in society. A person is a member of society irrespective of that person's 
transgressions. Thus the life of a law abiding citizen is as important as the life of one who has 
taken the life of another. 
22 Para 308. 
23 Para 131. 
12 
In his judgement, Madala J dealt with the manner in which ubuntu corresponds with 
rehabilitation. His judgement mainly focused on the possibility of reforming the offender25 . 
The possibility of reformation is always inherent in ubuntu, which acknowledges that a human 
being is despite transgressions capable of reform and at a later stage should be allowed to 
resume a normal role in society. 
To summarise: the judgements in Makwanyane stress the need for application of ubuntu as an 
extra-textual aid to constitutional interpretation. The emphasis on unconditional respect for 
human dignity corresponds with one of the founding values of the 1996 Constitution which is 
respect for human dignity. 
2.6 Advancement and empowerment 
Although ubuntu requires the equal and dignified treatment of all persons irrespective of 
circumstances, the poorest of the poor members of the community receive more generously 
from traditional leaders in the spirit of ubuntu than those considered well to do. Members of a 
community can collectively plough the fields of these unfortunate members of the community. 
Furthermore, these less fortunate members can be allowed to stay at the kraal of the 
traditional leader under the latter's care. The understanding is that for the poor of the poorest 
to be equal with other members of the community, measures must be taken to make them 
equal with others in the true sense of the word. This is not seen as punishing the well to do 
24 Para 225. 
25 Paras 242-244. 
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for the social ills of the poor. For example, a fully grown young man who cannot afford 
payment of lobolo, can have it paid for him by a traditional leader or his relatives. The reason 
is to make him substantively equal with his peers. 
This can be linked to the present affirmative action contemplated in section 9(2) of the 1996 
Constitution which allows for the advancement of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. The purpose of ubuntu in advancing certain members of the community is not 
because these members were necessarily previously disadvantaged but to make them equal 
with others not only in a formal sense, but substantially as well. This form of ubuntu is done 
with the spirit of sharing since it is considered inhuman not to share. 
2. 7 Transparency and reconciliation 
Another feature of ubuntu which fits into the wider constitutional picture is decisions affecting 
people. The essence of this concept is that decisions are not taken on the basis of majority 
vote but consensus26 . In this regard the main aim is to accommodate the views of the 
minority. Furthermore, decisions by governing bodies have to be transparent. This can be 
linked to the right to access to information held by the state and the right to administrative 
justice contemplated in sections 32 and 33 of the 1996 Constitution. These two values 
constitute a foundation of open and transparent governance. 
One of the features of ubuntu is the avoidance of confrontation or revenge. It focuses more 
on tolerance. As stated earlier on, children at an early age are taught not to seek revenge 
26Mb· . 1g1 note 8 at 70. 
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when hurt. This value of non-revenge has found its way into the 1993 Constitution and item 
22 of schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution, and has further been enhanced by the amnesty 
process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The value of non-revenge is further 
complemented by the spirit of ubuntu, which puts more emphasis on rehabilitation and 
tolerance of criminals. 
2.8 Freedom of speech 
Freedom of speech is another feature of ubuntu which fits into the wider constitutional picture. 
Freedom of speech in the spirit of ubuntu is recognised in various forms including artistic 
creativity and imparting information or ideas. In traditional communities this value featured 
prominently in songs criticising governing institutions. It was common to find villagers 
ploughing a field of a traditional leader singing about their complaints regarding certain 
aspects of governance. 
Criticism of governing institutions was more acceptable than criticising an individual. 27 In this 
regard Schapera observes: 
The Chief himself is not above the law. Should his action run counter to accepted standards of 
what is right and proper, he is severely criticised by his councillors and the people at large. 
This form of freedom of expression helps to strengthen good governance. 
It is clear that the application of extra-textual aids has far-reaching implications . The concept 
of ubuntu which has succeeded in sustaining generations of the past is not foreign to the 
values the Constitution seeks to promote, because those values contain elements of respect for 
27I Schapera The Bantu-speaking tribes of South Africa Maskew Miller (1966) 184. 
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human dignity. The picture that I envisage for ubuntu in constitutional interpretation is that 
courts should apply it where the question of human dignity has to be considered. This view 
finds support in the fact that ubuntu gives respect for human dignity its fullest meaning. 
16 
CHAPTER3 
UBUNTU AND AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
In what follows, the link between ubuntu and African jurisprudence (as well as other 
constitutional values that may be used during constitutional interpretation) are discussed. Like 
the uniqueness of values which any other Constitution may seek to promote, ubuntu as a 
constitutional value has its own unique characteristics. 
If one were to greet a Sotho-speaking person and say 0 Kae or in Zulu Ku njani? (How are 
you?) the answers would respectively be Re teng and Si khona (y{e are fine). An African 
always describes himself not as an individual but as a member of a clan or group. This 
signifies that that person owes existence to a larger group. The feeling of belonging to a 
group is part of Africans' languages, ritual ceremonies and culture which forms part of 
ubuntu. 
3.1 Individual rights and the group 
The African Charter on Human and People's Rights which is also a source of African 
jurisprudence has its own features. It draws heavily on the OAU Charter which provides that 
freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives of the achievement of the 
legitimate expectations of the African peoples28 . It provides for the protection of people's 
rights which allows for an individual to exercise rights within the context of a group29. It also 
28 Preamble to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. 
29 Dlamini note 6 at 89; I A Badawi El Sheik 'The African Regional System' in MC 
Bassiouni and Z Motala The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings 
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imposes duties on an individual towards family, society and the state, as well as the 
strengthening of cultural values in the spirit of tolerance. This is in no doubt a reflection of the 
African culture of human rights where an individual cannot exercise rights in isolation, but 
with due regard to the collective rights of the community30 . 
It is part of ubuntu that individual rights are exercised within the context of the group. This is 
an interesting link with the German sozial rechsstaat which balances communitarian socio-
economic rights and liberal political and civil rights. 31 Obligations imposed by the Charter on 
an individual towards family, society and the state and those imposed by ubuntu, both 
acknowledge individual rights within the context of a group. 
Amongst the Venda payment of lumalo or lobolo is never made in full. The reason for this is 
that the relationship between two family groups never comes to an end. 32 Since marriage is 
regarded as a matter between family groups, and not individuals, there will always be an 
obligation between the two families to mutually support each other in case of need 
Furthermore, the African Charter emphasises that an individual has an inborn duty to serve 
the community without reward, because the essence of African governance is characterised by 
Martinus Nijhoff (1991) 25; A G J M Sanders 'The characteristic features of Southern 
African Law' (1981) CILSA 329 at 333. 
30Article 27. 
31De Wet note 4 at 31. 
321 C Bekker Seymour's Customary Law in Southern African Juta (1989) 96; CR M 
Dlamini 'A judicial analysis and critical evaluation of ilobolo in a changing Zulu society' in T 
W Bennet Sourcebook of African Customary Law of African Customary Law for Southern 
Africa Juta (1991) 200. 
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enhancement of collective solidarity, trust and compassion33 . 
3.2 Reconciliation in African jurisprudence 
One of the distinct features of the African Charter is that unlike the American Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides for the establishment of a human 
rights court to review cases brought before it, it does not make provision for such a court34. 
This is attributed to the fact that African jurisprudence prefers the settlement of disputes 
through conciliation rather than courts of law. This is a feature of ubuntu. More emphasis is 
on reconciliation of members who belong to the same group. Taking a matter to court that 
can be settled through conciliation without first attempting conciliation is foreign to African 
jurisprudence. 
3.3 Communitarianism 
In Africa life centres around the group, not the individual. The exercise of an individual right 
is understood in the context of a group. Although the term 'Peoples' is not defined in the 
Charter, it is submitted that this involves this involves peoples linked by shared common 
values. Individualism in the strict sense of the word is foreign to Africa and as such a 
communitarian approach to constitutional interpretation would always be appropriate in 
Africa. In this context the idiom Umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu (which signifies the centrality 
of mutual support and sharing of resources) becomes more appropriate. The real and lasting 
33 Mbigi note 8 at 70. SBO Gutto 'Group v individual identity in the African debate on 
human rights' (1995) ALR 42-45; CR M Dlamini 'Towards a regional protection of human 
rights in Africa: The African Charter on human and people's rights' (1991) CILSA 198. 
34 W L Seriti 'The African Charter on human rights' (1995) ALR; 16; PK Rakate 'The 
status of traditional courts under the final Constitution' (1997) CILSA 175 at 187. 
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duty imposed on an individual in the exercise of human rights is to balance individual rights 
against the rights of others. As a result the African approach to human rights favours the 
common good of society. The overall rights of the community often prevail over individual 
rights and freedom. 
3.4 The question of indigenous values debate 
The viewpoint that our legal system should reflect indigenous values rooted in history has 
been strengthened by a call for the application of value judgements, which also involves the 
determination of their content. 35 In this regard Heyns says: 
Our Constitution must be truly legitimate, it must reflect the soul of our nation, it must be 
an expression of our history and our deepest values because on them will it have the 
36 
spontaneous support of our people. 
This was a call that our Constitution should be deeply rooted in African soil and thus reflect 
indigenous values which the people had a part in developing. 37 In other words, the values that 
our Constitution seeks to promote must be part of our history and form part of the nation's 
pride and culture. 
Thus Sachs J had the following to say38 : 
35A Sachs 'Towards a Bill of Rights for a democratic South Africa' (1991) JAL 21 at 
30-31. C Heyns African human rights law and the European Convention (1995) SAJHR 252 
at 260, S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (NMHC) at 813. 
36Heyns 'Where is the Voice of Africa in our Constitution' Centre for Human Rights 
(1996) Occasional Paper 8. 
37 AJ G M Sanders 'The Bill of Rights issue: Look at the rest of Africa' (1990) 
SAPRIPL 185 at 192. 
38 S v Mhlungu 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) at para 127. 
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We are a new Court, established in a new way, to deal with a new Constitution. We should not 
rush to lay down sweeping and inflexible rules governing our mode of analysis. We need to develop 
an appropriately South African way of dealing with our Constitution, one that starts with the 
Constitution itself, acknowledges the way it came into being, its languag,e spirit, style and inner 
logic, the interests it protects and the painful experiences it guards against, its place in the 
evolution of our country, our society and our legal system, and its existence as part of a global 
development of constitutionalism and human rights. 
Such an approach clearly goes beyond the text of the Constitution, since it acknowledges the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution to frame it as they did and give content to the 
values which the framers had in mind when framing it. Furthermore, it must reflect the core 
values of society. Mhlungu, not only paved the way for the application of indigenous values, 
but also posed a challenge to subsequent decisions to reflect the soul of the nation. In this 
way we will take pride in what is indigenously ours. 
Even before Mhlungu, a view was held that certain values should prevail in a community. A 
former Chief Justice had the following to say in this regard:39 
A community has certain common values and norms. These are in part a heritage from the past. 
To some extent too they are the product of the influence of other communities; of the interaction 
that takes place between peoples in all spheres of human activity; of the sayings and writings of the 
philosophers, the thinkers, the leaders, which have universal human appeal; ...•• the judge must 
become 'the living voice of the people' he must ••• interpret society to its~lf 
Courts should accept overall responsibility for giving content to the values which the 
Constitution seeks to promote. The emphasis placed on human dignity and social justice in the 
Constitution presupposes that these values must be given an indigenous perspective. In 
Makwanyane40 Mokgoro J placed particular importance on the importance of indigenous 
39 M Corbett 'Aspects of the role of policy in the evolution of our common law' 
(1987) SALJ 52 at 67. 
40 At para 300. 
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South African values41 . Sachs J agreed that traditional believes and values of all sectors of 
society must be taken into account. 42 He went on further to say that values peculiar to African 
society should have been placed before the court during the debate about the death penalty. In 
my view this is a challenge to the courts to utilise expert evidence of those members of our 
community who are knowledgeable in African jurisprudence and for legal academics to include 
it in their curricula as responsibility to promote our values cannot be left to the judiciary alone. 
3.5 Constitutional link 
The 1996 Constitution recognises the imposition of duties and responsibilities of citizenship in 
section 3. The imposition of duties and responsibilities presupposes that a person's right is 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others. In this context it is worth noting that 
individualism is foreign to African jurisprudence. The real and lasting effect of the duty 
imposed on an individual is that such individual is expected to perform certain duties: not for 
reward, but rather to help and support the community of which the individual is a member. At 
all times there is always a feeling of reciprocity between an individual and the community. 
Thus Mahomed J in Makwanyane emphasised reciprocity in interaction with the collective 
humanity43 when he said: 
The need for ubuntu" expresses the ethos of an instinctive capacity for and enjoyment of 
love towards our fellow men and women, the joy and the fulfilment involved in recognising 
their innate humanity, the reciprocity this generates and in interaction within the 
collective community; the richness of the creative emotions which it engenders the moral 
41 At para 361. 
42 At para 370. 
43 At para 263. 
energies which it releases both in givers and the society which they serve and are served 
by. 
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The African value system which allows for imposition of duties on a citizen to exercise rights 
with due regard to the rights of the community can be applied as an extra- textual aid to 
interpretation. This will be in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution which is based on 
the will of the people. Again this approach reflects the importance of the group. In 
adjudicating on the exercise of individual rights courts should appreciate the importance of 
striking a balance between individual and community rights. 
3.6 Conciliation and rehabilitation. 
As pointed out earlier, the 1996 Constitution is drafted in a conciliatory manner. This is to be 
found in the requirement for the establishment of a state based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights. All courts, forums and tribunals, are enjoined by 
section 3 9 to promote these values, and it may be argued that the framers also had courts and 
tribunals known to the African people in mind. Traditional courts, which also apply ubuntu in 
resolving disputes, are also called upon to promote these values. 
Another feature of African jurisprudence is that the possibility of rehabilitation is recognised 
more often than not. In Makwanyane Madala J thus emphasised the need to recognise the 
possibility of rehabilitation44. As an individual is part and parcel of the community, it is always 
felt that at some stage that individual will be reconciled with the community through 
rehabilitation. Punishment must reflect the community's morals that a human being is capable 
44Paras 241-244. 
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of rehabilitation through reconciliation with the community. This underscores the tolerance 
and forgiveness inherent in ubuntu, 45 and our courts can promote this value through taking 
into account the possibility of reconciliation of an offender with the community through 
rehabilitation. 
Like any other society no rights are absolute. Ubuntu recognises the exercises of rights within 
limits. Individual rights are exercised within the limits prescribed by society. The nexus 
between limits imposed by ubuntu in the exercise of rights and constitutional limits is that both 
acknowledge that no right is absolute. 
One argument that can be advanced from what has been sketched above is that South Africans 
are united in their diversity, and ubuntu as a constitutional value should be applied in 
constitutional interpretation and thereby form part of the emerging South African 
jurisprudence. Our legal system should promote this indigenous value which international 
jurisprudence may well emulate in future. 
45 Dlomo note 12. 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that there is a telling challenge to all courts, tribunals and other forums to 
promote indigenous values in constitutional interpretation as well. Coupled to the promotion 
of these values is the legitimacy question. An in-depth reading of the 1996 Constitution 
reveals that values which the Constitution seeks to promote are both African and Western. As 
pointed out earlier, the Constitutional Court should accept overall responsibility for addressing 
the legitimacy question of the judiciary. It is submitted that the promotion of societal values 
will go a long way in addressing this question of legitimacy. 
It needs to be emphasised that there are valuable lessons to be learnt from the African value 
system. It is characterised by unconditional respect for human dignity. Furthermore, it 
recognises that a person's worth as a human being can only be expressed fully through 
interaction with others. An individual is obliged to exercise rights with due regard to 
community rights which at times may prevail over individual rights. 46 As South Africa has a 
wealth of diverse cultures, only values which reflect the will, demands, biases and legal 
convictions of those who are affected by them should prevail. 47 
46Ferni Odenkunle 'Strategy and policies for the advancement of human rights in the 
administration of criminal justice in Africa - an outline' in Bassiouniu and Motala note 29 at 
51; for a discussion of a synthesis of theses rights see the definition of soziale rechstaat in De 
Wet note 31. 
47C Heyns 'Reasonableness in a divided society' (1990) SALf 279 at 280-282. 
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Most western democratic societies place a high value upon individual freedom as against the 
collective rights of the community. To suggest that traditional liberal values do not fully 
reflect the spirit and the soul of the South African nation, does not necessarily reflect an anti-
Western bias. Only 'home-brewed' values can stand the test of time48 . However, the 
promotion of these values cannot be left to courts alone. 
It will be recalled that the historic 1994 elections were preceded by voter education 
unparalleled in this country since all sectors of the community were involved. At this moment 
the retentionists are shouting for the return of the death penalty. The majority of South 
Africans are not aware that ubuntu which permeates their daily life, is one of the reasons why 
the death penalty has been found to be unconstitutional in Makwanyane. Perhaps this is an 
opportune moment for the government to launch a campaign aimed at teaching the 'people' 
that the Constitution they voted for in 1994 calls for inter alia the promotion of African values 
permeated by respect for human dignity. The promotion of African values calls for a 
tremendous effort on the part of the courts, government, media and legal academics to 
promote a new approach to understanding our values. This will undoubtedly enhance our 
Constitution and the role of the judiciary. As individual rights may conflict with the exercise 
of rights within the context of a group, the solution lies in reconciling them in such a manner 
that accords with society's hopes and aspirations. 49 Arguably the exercise of individual rights 
(as understood in Western democracies) and the exercise of rights within the context of a 
48 Heyns note 35 252 at 260. 
49 
see 'Recommendations of the Gaborone Seminar on Human Rights and 
Development in Africa' in Bassiouni and Motala note 29 at 470-472 see also C Villa-Vicencio 
Whither South Africa? Constitutionalism and Law-Making (1991) Emory Law Journal 141 at 
157. 
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group can be used to complement each other in a conciliatory manner. 
Lastly courts have an ever-lasting duty to pursue the accomplishment of the core purpose the 
Constitution set the nation to achieve: the promotion and enhancement of human rights in the 
spirit of human dignity. 50 It is hoped that courts will interpret the Constitution in a manner 
that will reconcile the exercise of individual rights with the exercise of rights within the 
context of a group by applying ubuntu as an extra-textual aid and thereby create a conciliatory 
bridge between these two categories of rights. 51 
50 See item 6( 1) of Schedule 2 of the 1996 Constitution regarding the oath or solemn 
affirmation of judicial officers to uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights in 
it; section 8(1) of the Constitution binds the judiciary as well, section 7(2) of the Constitution 
places an obligation on the state to promote and fulfil the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
51Heyns note 36 at 11; Davis note 6. 
